While open science approaches aim to foster transparency and collaboration, they can, in some cases, create opportunities for research misconduct, such as the misuse of research outputs shared in open access. Preventing misconduct in the context of open science involves implementing certain practices and principles. An essential step is fostering a culture of integrity and mutual learning within the scientific community. Researchers should actively listen to the perspectives of others, acknowledging the value of different forms of expertise. This involves creating spaces for open dialogue, where researchers feel comfortable expressing their viewpoints. 

Kohr et al. outline eleven strategies to make training in open science, including training on research integrity, more common at research institutions. The ultimate aim of such training is to create a broad coalition and change the research culture and practice.

Eleven strategies for making reproducible research & open science training the norm at research institutions. Source: Kohrs F.E. et al. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.89736, CC BY 4.0

Another important approach to prevent research misconduct in the context of open science is to work towards epistemic justice. Epistemic injustice, a concept introduced by philosopher Miranda Fricker, refers to unfairness in the distribution of epistemic (knowledge-related) goods, where individuals or groups are wronged in their capacity as knowers. Epistemic injustice occurs when knowledge claims are unfairly rejected, or when the knowledge possessed by certain types of knowers is excluded or not taken seriously because of prejudices about the knower, violating the principles of responsibility, respect, and accountability (Fricker, 2007). In science, research results from well-known groups at prestigious universities or from researchers in the 'centers' are often evaluated as ‘better’ than those from less well-known groups. This bias contradicts the principle of equality of opportunities. In the open science context, these epistemic reception biases leading to epistemic injustice are likely to persist, possibly extending to open data. Thus, the envisioned advantage of open science in terms of quality and integrity and, consequently, more efficient knowledge production for the benefit of all, regardless of their current privilege or wealth status, might not materialize. Instead, the already existing advantages of the privileged could become even more entrenched. 

These issues of epistemic injustice and bias can turn into issues of distributive injustice if research and funding institutions do not consider them when recognizing or making decisions based on the evaluation of research contributions. Promoting transparency in research practices is crucial for preventing epistemic injustice. Researchers should openly share their data, methodologies, and results, allowing for validation by the wider scientific community. This not only enhances the reliability of research but also provides opportunities for different voices and viewpoints to be heard.

Before proceeding to the next task, please, read the paper by Haven, T. et al. (2022). Promoting trust in research and researchers: How open science and research integrity are intertwined. BMC Research Notes, 15(1), 302. 

References

1. Fricker, M (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Kohrs, F. E., et al. (2023). Eleven strategies for making reproducible research and open science training the norm at research institutions. Elife, 12, e89736. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.89736